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call themselves idealists and those who, whether they call themselves 'naturalists' or 'materialists' or 'empiricists,' are agreed in finding the structure of 'things' by 'mind' arrant rubbish, and in finding an intellectual agnosticism the only possible attitude towards ultimate Reality? It is true that unless M. Bergson can see his way to the development of his intuitionism, a development which will give us a really trustworthy bridge between it and intellectualism (if he still is unable to allow their identity at bottom), then his new 'philosophy' must remain esoteric, and be,—even for the inner circle,—a new agnosticism. I think this book contains some intimation of some such possible development (*e. g.*, pp. 326, 389, 390). Idealists, on their side, will not be hurt by being reminded that there may be more things in heaven and earth than are included in their philosophy.

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CREATIVE EVOLUTION. By Henri Bergson. Translated by Arthur Mitchell, Ph.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. viii, 425.

The work of translation, a peculiarly difficult task when French has to be rendered into English, has been in the main very successfully done. The book stands better than most works of the kind, the test of being read by itself without reference to the French; by far the greater part of it might well be taken for a spirited original treatise. It is only here and there that an unidiomatic sentence betrays to a careful eye or ear that one is dealing with a version, and that the book from which the version is made was written in French. Thus I find one instance (p. 384) of the inversion, not uncommon in French, but intolerable in English prose, by which an adjective predicate is made to precede its subject ("Relative, therefore, seemed to be sensuous intuition"). Occasionally French idiom is followed in the use of prepositions with an unfortunate effect. Thus (p. 347), "to dispense us with this effort," meaning "to dispense us from" or "to enable us to dispense with" (p. 233); "What hopeless difficulties philosophy falls into *for* not having undertaken this task," should be, "through not having undertaken," or, better, "because she has not undertaken." Our personality is said to "coast around" space continually in sen-

sation (p. 212). I am not, indeed, sure of M. Bergson's meaning, but I think "it skirts" it would at least be a more idiomatic rendering of "*elle le côtoie*" than that given by the translator. On page 181 we hear of a musical theme "which had first been transposed, the theme as a whole, into a certain number of tones"; here the words "the theme" look like a printer's or author's accidental repetition; they would be better away, and "tones" is a mistranslation for "keys." In the next sentence *infiniment* has been toned down into a colorless "very." Page 154 there is an ambiguity due to the lack of gender in English, where the French is perfectly clear; "it"—the larva of the Sitaris . . . "seizes the opportunity to pass from the male [bee] to the female, and quietly waits until *it* lays its eggs." One has to learn from the context that the egg-laying "it" is the bee; by English idiom it should be the larva of the Sitaris. Page 103, we are oddly told that when a shell bursts near us we only see "the movements of the pulverized explosions"; Bergson's word is *éclats*, which, of course, has its literal sense, "the splinters." At page 92, the expression used of the *élan vital*, that *il se partage* along different lines of evolution should, in view of M. Bergson's doctrines at large, be rendered "divides itself," not "gets divided." At page 56 the statement that our intellect is "an abstract view of the cause of its own being" is obscure, and hardly represents the original, "*étant elle-même une abstraction opérée sur la cause d'où elle émane*." Page 12, I am not sure whether "eventual actions" is really a proper rendering for *actions virtuelles*, virtual actions, *i. e.*, acts which may or may not be executed according as the proper occasion does or does not present itself. "Eventual" in this sense strikes me as more German than English. So on page 9 *un nombre déterminé* should not have been translated "a certain number," since in idiomatic English that phrase always means an *uncertain* number and thus gives the exact reverse of the author's meaning. Page 6, *nous pourrions à la rigueur rayer ce souvenir* should not have been softened down into the translator's "even could we erase this memory." This implies that we cannot actually erase it, whereas Bergson distinctly says that *à la rigueur* we might do so. Page 5, line 13, *sans doute* ought not to be corrected into "probably" (unless, indeed, M. Bergson himself expressly directed such a weakening of his original statement).

I may add that I have found one or two cases where a preposition has been made exclusive in the English by the insertion of an unwarranted 'only,' and also of the reverse process by which a preposition which is emphatically exclusive in the French has lost its exclusive force in translation. For my own part, I should regard carelessness on so important a point as much more serious than the one or two slips or unidiomatic renderings to which I have referred. Taken all together, these minor blemishes detract little from an excellent piece of work. As is usually the case with Messrs. Macmillan's publications, the paper and type are exceedingly good.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY AND VALUE. The Gifford Lectures for 1911, delivered in Edinburgh University. By B. Bosanquet. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. xxxvii, 409.

A new book by Dr. Bosanquet, and especially a series of Gifford Lectures by him, is sure to be welcomed and eagerly read by all who are interested in philosophical discussion. Hence, in writing a review of it, it can hardly be necessary to give any detailed account of its contents,—especially as a very complete analysis of its argument is prefixed to it by the author. It may suffice to say that the present work is a restatement, with some modifications, of the general philosophical position of Mr. Bradley, set forth in a more positive form than that which was given to it by the latter in his "Appearance and Reality," and with more definite indications of the ways in which it may be used in dealing with some of the larger problems of life. This was certainly a work worth doing. Mr. Bradley's great book, fascinating as it is for every lover of profound speculation, has repelled or disappointed many readers by its dialectical form and by the apparently negative or vague character of its main results. The views set forth by him are apt to present themselves, at least to his more superficial or impatient readers, in the form of some such summary as this: (1) All reality is individual, (2) There is only one individual, (3) That one is not an individual; or (1) Reality is a self-consistent whole, (2) Only the Absolute is self-consistent, (3) The